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Lessons
from California
M he use of peremptory
challenges in selecting
juries is subject to new
limitations since the Su-
preme Court's decision in
Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. - , 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90
L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). If a defendant
makes a prima facie showing that
members of his race are being ex-
cluded by the prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges, the burden
shifts to the prosecution "to come
forward with a neutral explanation"
for the challenges. 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
In overruling its contrary holding in
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85
S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), the
Court left criminal practitioners to
wrestle with the implementation of
the decision. Justice White, who
authored Swain, warned in his con-
curring opinion that "much litiga-
tion will be required to spell out the
contours" of the new ruling. 106
S.Ct. at 1725.
As prosecutors, defense lawyers
and judges struggle to define the
contours of Batson, they may be
guided by the decisions of the Cal-
ifornia courts. The California Su-
preme Court imposed similar
limitations on peremptory chal-
lenges in 1978, in People v. Wheeler,
22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890,
583 P.2d 748. Since Wheeler, nu-
merous California cases have dealt
with many of the questions left un-
resolved in Batson. Although there
are significant differences between
Batson and Wheeler, the courts of
other states will frequently find that
"the California cases give meaning
to the requirements of Batson v.
Kentucky." Slappy v. State, 503 So.2d
350, 355 (Fla.Ct.App. 1987).
At the outset, it should be noted
that Wheeler was based on the right,
under the California state constitu-
tion, to a jury panel drawn from a
representative cross-section of the
population. Although the argument
was made in Batson that the Court
should rely on a parallel right under
the Sixth Amendment, the case was
decided on traditional equal pro-
tection grounds. The difference is
significant. At least three limitations
flow from the Court's use of an equal
protection analysis.
First, only a defendant who is a
member of the class being excluded
by a peremptory challenge will have
standing to seek the protection of
Batson. Under Wheeler, the right to
a representative cross-section can
be asserted by any defendant to
prevent the exclusion of a cogniza-
ble group from the jury. Occasion-
ally, a prosecutor might systematic-
ally exclude blacks even though a
defendant is white, in anticipation
of a defense to which it is assumed
blacks might be more sympathetic.
Examples include a charge of as-
saulting a police officer, where the
defendant is claiming self-defense
against police brutality, or if a white
defendant has been arrested in a
civil rights demonstration. It should
be noted that even under Wheeler,
however, a prima facie showing of
improper exclusion "gains strength"
if the defendant is a member of the
excluded group. People v. Motton,
39 Cal.3d 596, 217 Cal.Rptr. 416,
422 n.3, 704 P.2d 176 (1985).
This distinction between Batson
and Wheeler was ignored in a re-
cent Arizona case, where a white
defendant represented by a black
attorney objected to the prosecu-
tor's use of peremptory challenges
to remove the only two blacks on
the jury panel. The court relied upon
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 92 S.Ct.
2163, 33 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972), and Civil
Rights Act cases to confer standing
on the defendant. A dissenting judge
found Batson controlling, but would
have conferred derivative standing
because the defendant's attorney
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was black. State v. Superior Court
(Gardner), 732 P.2d 232 (Ariz.Ct.
App. 1987). Both positions are mis-
guided if the U.S. Supreme Court
sticks with the equal protection
clause as the constitutional under-
pinning for Batson. In Peters v. Kiff,
there was no majority opinion, and
neither plurality opinion relied upon
equal protection grounds. Three of
the justices cited the "due process"
clause, and three cited statutory au-
thority to allow a white defendant
to challenge the exclusion of blacks
from the grand jury which indicted
him. Broader standing would be
available under the Sixth Amend-
ment analysis. In Fields v. People, 732
P.2d 1145 (1987), the Colorado Su-
preme Court utilized a Sixth
Amendment analysis to confer
standing upon a black defendant
objecting to the exclusion of Span-
ish-surname jurors.
Second, only the exclusion of ra-
cial classes can be challenged under
Batson. Wheeler has extended pro-
tection to other groups as well. In
People v. Motton, supra, the court
held black women were a cogniza-
ble class under Wheeler, and in Peo-
ple v. Turner, 42 Cal.3d. 711, 230
Cal.Rptr 656, 726 P.2d 102 (1986),
the court suggested that exclusion
of working-class people would also
be impermissible. In People v. Mora,
190 Cal.App.3d 208, 235 Cal.Rptr.
340 (1987), the exclusion of youth-
ful jurors was condemned.
While traditional equal protec-
tion analysis extends to other groups
besides racial minorities, including
classifications based on sex, age, re-
ligious or political affiliation, marital
status, sexual preference or profes-
sion, only classifications based on
race, ethnicity or national origin
have achieved the stature of a "strict
scrutiny" analysis. Perhaps that ex-
plains why Batson was explicitly lim-
ited to cases in which the defendant
shows he is "a member of a cogniz-
able racial group." 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
While a different burden of proof
might be appropriate, there doesn't
appear to be any reason why Bat-
Gerald F. Uelmen is Dean of the
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son's protection should not be ex-
panded to other groups. Chief
Justice Burger recognized this prob-
lem in his Batson dissent. 106 S.Ct.
at 1737.
Third, Batson has no immediate
effect upon the use of peremptories
in a racially discriminatory manner
by the defense. Dissenting in Bat-
son, Chief Justice Burger ques-
tioned whether the Court could
rationally hold that defendants are
not limited to the same extent as
prosecutors in their use of peremp-
tory challenges. 106 S.Ct. at 1738.
Such a limitation would require
moving beyond the equal protec-
tion analysis used in Batson, how-
ever. Wheeler clearly applies equally
to prosecution and defense. The
only reported case applying the lim-
itation to defense counsel is Pagel v.
California, 186 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1,
232 Cal.Rptr. 104 (1986), in which
the dismissal of a jury panel was up-
held after defense counsel used
peremptory challenges to strike
three black jurors. The defendant
was a white accused of a hit and run
accident injuring a black child. A
petition for certiorari to the U.S. Su-
preme Court was denied.
The problem of defense peremp-
tories is not insignificant. Manuals for
defense lawyers abound with ad-
vice suggesting the exclusion of ju-
rors based on ethnic and religious
stereotypes. The classic advice of-
fered by Clarence Darrow on pick-
ing juries advised defense lawyers
that it would be malpractice to strike
an Irishman, while Presbyterians,
Baptists and Lutherans should be
avoided. See Jeans, Trial Advocacy,
7.7. A more recent trial manual sug-
gested that Catholics are "least de-
sirable" for an insanity defense, and
that "Negroes are generally ill-
equipped to evaluate psychiatric
testimony." Shadoan, Law and Tac-
tics in Federal Criminal Cases (1964).
Prosecutors have no monopoly on
racism. Where the victim is a mem-
ber of a cognizable racial group, de-
fense lawyers frequently use
peremptories to remove prospec-
tive jurors from the same group.
Batson itself concedes that the harm
of such practices extends beyond
the excluded juror to undermine
public confidence in the fairness of
the system. 106 S.Ct. at 1718.
These three differences should
not dissuade lawyers from objecting
to the use of peremptory challenges
to remove identifiable groups, even
if the defendant is not a member of
the group, the group is not a racial
minority, or the peremptories are
coming from the defense. A record
should be made, and the exclusion
should be challenged on broader
Sixth Amendment grounds. The
Batson Court did not reject the Sixth
Amendment claims, but simply re-
served them for another day. That
day may come soon, but its benefits
may be lost in those cases where an
appropriate record wasn't made.
Making a prima facie showing
In Batson, the prosecutor used
four of six allowable peremptory
challenges to excuse all four black
persons on the venire. The majority
opinion remanded for a determi-
nation whether a prima facie show-
ing of purposeful discrimination was
made. Under the California cases,
this would clearly be sufficient. A
prima facie case was found in Peo-
ple v. Clay, 153 Cal.App.3d 433, 200
Cal.Rptr. 269 (1984), when four of
ten challenges removed all blacks,
Holley v. I & I Sweeping Co., 143
Cal.App 3d 588, 192 Cal.Rptr. 74
( 983), when three of six challenges
removed three out of four blacks,
and People v. Fuller, 136 Cal.App.3d
403, 186 Cal.Rptr. 283 (1982), when
three challenges were used to re-
move all blacks. In People v. Rous-
seau, 129 Cal.App.3d 526, 179
Cal.Rptr. 892 (1982), on the other
hand, the use of two peremptories
to excuse the only two black jurors
was found insufficient for a prima fa-
cie showing.
Despite Rousseau, one should not
read the California cases as permit-
ting up to three strikes before you're
"out." While cases involving three
or more strikes of an identifiable
group have generally concluded the
prima facie showing was sufficient,
there is no reason why two strikes
(Continued on page 38)
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(Continued from page 4)
wouldn't be enough in combination
with other circumstances. In assess-
ing the prima facie showing, Califor-
nia courts have also looked at the
intensiveness of voir dire question-
ing of challenged jurors by counsel.
If questioning was "desultory," an
improper motive is considered more
likely. Since few federal judges al-
low counsel to personally conduct
voir dire questioning, this factor may
not have the same significance in
federal cases.
A prima facie showing does not
require that all members of the
group have been removed, al-
though that will certainly strengthen
the showing. In People v. Motton,
supra, the prosecutor argued that
the prima facie showing was rebut-
ted by the fact that the prosecution
passed the jury while blacks were
still on it. The court noted how eas-
ily jury selection could be manipu-
lated if a "pass" with blacks still on
the jury were regarded as conclu-
sive. 217 Cal.Rptr. at 423.
In cities where blacks or other mi-
norities predominate, a prima facie
case may be much more difficult to
establish. In Washington, D.C., for
example, where 70 percent of pro-
spective jurors are black, a recent
opinion noted that the prospect of
an all-white jury is "non-existent,"
so Batson had little relevance. The
greater danger was that defense at-
torneys would eliminate all the
whites from juries of black defen-
dants, a practice Batson leaves un-
regulated. United States v. Cosby, 40
Cr.L.Rptr. 2411 (D.C.Super.Ct.,
1987).
Frequently, the systematic exclu-
sion of a racial group is not apparent
from the record. Jurors are not or-
dinarily asked to state their race, and
counsel's characterizations based on
observations may be the only rec-
ord available. In People v. Motton,
supra, for example, after the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court reversed a
death penalty case because blacks
were systematically excluded by the
use of peremptory challenges, a ju-
ror who sat on the case called the
press to report she was black. See 71
A.B.A.]. 22 (Nov., 1985). The court
was unmoved by the revelation. As
it noted in its opinion, "discrimina-
tion is more often based on appear-
ances than verified racial descent,"
so a prima facie case could be based
on systematic excusal of jurors who
appeared to be black. 217 Cal.Rptr.
at 420-2
The burden of justification
In concurring in Batson, Justice
Thurgood Marshall lamented the
difficulty of assessing the explana-
tions prosecutors offer for their per-
emptories. "Any prosecutor can
easily assert facially neutral reasons
for striking a juror, and trial courts
are ill-equipped to second-guess
those reasons." 106 S.Ct. at 1728. If
the prosecutor explains that the
black juror he struck appeared "sul-
len," is that good enough? Justice
Marshall noted that unconscious
racism may lead prosecutors and
judges to characterize a black ju-
ror's conduct as "sullen" when the
same conduct of a white juror would
be ignored.
The risk is well illustrated by some
of the earliest cases decided after
Batson was announced. In Branch v.
State, 40 Cr.L.Rptr. 2215 (1986), the
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
found the prosecutor's explanations
for peremptorily excusing all six black
jurors were sufficient, including ex-
planations that one juror "appeared
to have kind of a dumfounded or
bewildered look on her face," an-
other appeared "unkept" and
"gruff," and a third was observed
"frowning" and seemed in a "bad
mood." In Wallace v. State, 41
Cr.L.Rptr. 2019 (1987), the same
court upheld the peremptory dis-
missal of six more black jurors, in-
dicating satisfaction with prosecu-
torial explanations that neither a
black homemaker nor a black fe-
male student would know "what life
is like out on the street," a black
"grandmotherly type" would be
t4444-~4444
"too sympathetic," and a black with
a beard might "go against the grain,"
especially since the defense attor-
neys also had beards.
California courts have regularly
rejected such explanations, be-
cause they don't relate to "specific
bias." As the California Supreme
Court observed in People v. Trevino,
39 Cal.3d 667, 217 Cal.Rptr. 652,
704 P.2d 719 (1985), a "specific rea-
son" isn't equivalent to "specific
bias." A bias relating to the partic-
ular case on trial or the parties or
witnesses is required. Thus general
explanations such as a juror's per-
ceived inability to make a decision
have been rejected. People v.
Washington, 188 Cal.App. 3d 794,
234 Cal.Rptr. 204 (1987). Signifi-
cantly, Justice Powell's majority
opinion in Batson declares that gen-
eral assertions aren't enough, and
that the prosecutor must articulate
an explanation "related to the par-
ticular case to be tried." 106 S.Ct.
at 1723. This can be readily trans-
lated into a test of specific bias sim-
ilar to that utilized in California.
The California courts have also
imposed upon trial judges a duty to
conduct a probing inquiry, rather
than to simply accept prosecutorial
explanations at face value. As de-
scribed in People v. Hall, 35 Cal.3d
161,167, 197 Cal.Rptr. 71, 75, 672
P.2d 854 (1983), "this demands of
the trial judge a sincere and rea-
soned attempt to evaluate the pros-
ecutor's explanation in light of the
circumstances of the case as then
known." The consistency of the
prosecutor's approach should be
probed. If the prosecutor claims a
black juror was excused because he
seemed "confused," the treatment
of white jurors who also indicated
confusion should be analyzed. See
People v. Turner, 42 Cal.3d. 711, 230
Cal.Rptr. 656, 726 P.2d 102 (1986).
Counsel who anticipate using
peremptories to strike minority ju-
rors should carefully utilize voir dire
examination to demonstrate specif-
ic bias. While the showing need not
rise to the level necessary to sustain
Criminal Justice
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a challenge for cause, it may be ad-
visable to assert a challenge for
cause before exercising the per-
emptory. The California cases sus-
taining a showing of specific bias
present examples of careful voir dire
questioning of the challenged jurors
preceding the challenge. In People
v. Chambie, 189 Cal.App.3d 149,
234 Cal.Rptr. 308 (1987), for ex-
ample, the use of peremptories to
excuse five out of six black jurors
was sustained where voir dire ques-
tioning demonstrated two chal-
lenged jurors had relatives who were
prosecuted for crimes, one was a
"defense oriented" first year law
student, one felt there was a "great"
possibility a woman could lie about
being raped, one voiced concern
about the financial hardship of serv-
ing on the jury, and one had served
on the jury in a case previously tried
by the prosecutor which ended in
acquittal.
In those federal courts that do not
permit counsel to personally con-
duct voir dire, it may be difficult to
make this kind of record. Counsel
should request the judge to ask spe-
cific follow-up questions before ex-
ercising a peremptory. Even if the
request is denied, it will corroborate
counsel's good faith concerns about
specific bias. Information elicited in
pretrial questionnaires sent to pro-
spective jurors can also be helpful
in supporting a show of specific bias.
U.S. v. Woods, 812 F.2d 1483 (4th
Cir. 1987).
Procedural remedies
Batson speaks only in collective
terms in defining the prosecutor's
burden to justify peremptory chal-
lenges. What if the prosecutor of-
fers acceptable explanations for
some, but not all, of the challenges?
The California cases have held that
an improper challenge to any one
juror is all that is necessary to estab-
lish a Wheeler violation. People v.
Washington, 188 Cal.App.3d 794,
234 Cal.Rptr. 204 (1987). Since
Wheeler is based on the right to a
representative cross-section, how-
ever, it doesn't necessarily follow
that an improper challenge to one
juror will establish a Batson viola-
tion. A violation of equal protection
may require a more systematic ex-
clusion.
If the prosecutor fails to meet the
explanatory burden imposed by
Batson, what should the trial judge
do? Reinstate the challenged jurors?
Declare a mistrial and start over? Or
simply strike the jury panel and call
in a fresh panel of jurors? Can the
trial judge preclude peremptory
challenges by the prosecution? In
Batson, Justice Powell noted the
various approaches taken by some
federal courts, see Booker v. labe,
775 F.2d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 1985);
U.S. v. Robinson, 421 F.Supp. 467,
474 (D.Conn. 1976), concluding that
the variety of jury selection prac-
tices followed made it inappro-
priate to offer instructions how its
ruling should be implemented. Nor
are these questions addressed in re-
ported California cases. In the single
case involving improper peremp-
tory challenges by the defense,
however, the trial court dismissed
the selected jurors and called in a
fresh jury panel. Pagel v. California,
186 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 104 (1986).
If the trial judge concluded that
the prosecutor's explanation rebuts
a claim of purposeful discrimina-
tion, what weight will be given to
this factual determination on ap-
peal? In Batson, Justice Powell not-
ed that since findings related to
discrimination largely turn on eval-
uation of credibility, "a reviewing
court ordinarily should give those
findings great deference." 1066 S.Ct.
at 1724, n.21. While California cas-
es pay lip service to this principle,
"decisions demonstrate however,
'ordinarily' does not mean 'inevita-
bly': in some cases the reviewing
court may conclude that the expla-
nation is inherently implausible in
light of the whole record." People v.
Turner, 230 Cal.Rptr. at 661, n. 6.
What if the trial court never re-
quired an explanation from the
prosecutor, erroneously concluding
a prima facie showing had not been
made? That's precisely the posture
of Batson itself, and the Court re-
manded to give the prosecutor an
opportunity to explain. California
cases are more selective in use of
the remand. Where three years
elapsed between the trial and the
review, for example, the California
Supreme Court simply reversed the
conviction, concluding:
It is unrealistic to believe that the
prosecutor could now recall in
greater detail his reasons for the
exercise of the peremptory chal-
lenges in issue, or that the trial
judge could assess those reasons,
as required, which would de-
mand that he recall the circum-
stances of the case, and the
manner in which the prosecutor
examined the venire and exer-
cised his other challenges. People
v. Hall, 197 Cal.Rptr. at 77.
Conclusion
Concluding his dissent in Batson,
Chief Justice Burger joined his col-
leagues in wishing 7,000 state trial
judges and 500 federal trial judges
well as they seek to "find their way
through the morass the Court cre-
ates today." 106 S.Ct. at 1741. Jus-
tice Marshall, in concurring, sug-
gested that the protection erected
by the Court may be illusory, and
called for banning the peremptory
challenge entirely. California has
been through the "morass" and
pursued the "illusion" for nine years.
Most criticism of the procedures
mandated in California remains un-
substantiated. People v. Hall, supra
at 76. While the California cases of-
fer no easy answers to the chal-
lenges posed by Batson, they have
certainly fostered a deeper con-
sciousness of the haunting presence
of racism at the bar of justice. Law-
yers and judges are achieving the
realization that ethnic stereotypes
have no place in the process of jury
selection. Lawyers must be called to
account for the apparent exclusion
of minorities in jury selection, and
judges must scrutinize those expla-
nations carefully. If we expect jurors
to lay aside their prejudices, we
must start by purging the jury selec-
tion process of our own. Ci
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